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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
WINTERGREEN GROUP, LC, a Utah : 
Limited Liability Company, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
: Case No. 20060338-SC 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, : 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRJEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Wintergreen cannot bring a second action arising out of the same transactions 
that are currently before the trial court in a prior lawsuit. The trial court correctly 
dismissed this entire action as being in violation of Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The grant of a motion to dismiss presents a matter 
of law, which this court reviews for correctness.*' Cook v. City of Moroni. 2005 UT App 
40,15, 107 P.3d 713. See also Russell Packard Dev.. Inc. v. Carson. 2005 UT 14,^3, 108 
P.3d 741 ("When reviewing the propriety of a motion to dismiss, we accept the factual 
1 
allegations in the complaint as true and interpret those facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party."). 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the Utah Department of 
Transportation's motion to dismiss and the memorandum in support thereof. R. 32-33, 
67-69, 102-03. 
2. An Ex Parte Young action cannot be brought against the State of Utah or its 
agencies. Such a claim can only be filed against officers or employees of the state. The 
trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs three § 1983 claims based on the Utah 
Department of Transportation's Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Same as for Issue 1. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the Utah Department of 
Transportation's motion to dismiss and the memorandum in support thereof. R. 32-33, 
67, 100-01. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Appendix A to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
During March and April of 2004, the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) 
filed three lawsuits seeking to condemn parts of several parcels of land owned by the 
plaintiff. Wintergreen Group (Wintergreen). R. 21-22. Orders of Immediate Occupancy 
in favor of UDOT were entered in all three condemnation actions on July 1, 2004. R. 2L 
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34-63. The condemnation actions have since been consolidated into a single action. R. 
178-80. 
On March 18, 2005, Wintergreen filed this action. R. 1-24. The only defendant is 
UDOT. R. 23-24. No state employees or officers were named as defendants. In its 
complaint, Wintergreen stated six causes of action. The first three causes of action were 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the takings provision of the 
Federal constitution. R. 17-20. a copy of the Complaint is attached hereto as Addendum 
B. The last three causes of action allege violations of the takings provision of the Utah 
constitution. R. 15-17. All of the claims raised by Wintergreen relate to the properties 
that are the subjects of the previously filed condemnation actions. UDOT filed a motion 
to dismiss on May 6, 2005. R. 31-71. The motion asked the trial court to dismiss this 
action as duplicative of the condemnation proceedings because "[t]he matter should be 
heard as a single action." R. 69. The motion also asked that the § 1983 claims be 
dismissed because UDOT is not a person that can be sued under that statute. R. 67. 
On March 6, 2006, the trial court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order 
dismissing this action. R. 169-77, a copy of the Memorandum Opinion and Order are 
attached hereto as Addendum C. The trial court recognized that UDOT was asking that 
all claims concerning the property in question should be decided in a single action and 
that § 1983 did not apply to UDOT. R. 175 ("UDOT further claims Wintergreen *s 
inverse condemnation action should be heard as a single action and that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
3 
does not apply to states or state officials action in their official capacities."). The court 
rejected plaintiffs claim that inverse condemnation claims were not based on the same 
transaction or occurrence as were the condemnation actions. R. 172-74. The trial court 
also found that § 1983 was not "applicable" to UDOT. R. 170. 
Wintergreen filed its notice of appeal on March 31, 2006. R. 181-83. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The only facts relevant to the legal issues raised by this appeal are those found in 
the Statement of the Case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wintergreen seeks to raise inverse condemnation claims in this action. All of its 
claims relate to the three ongoing condemnation proceedings (since consolidated) 
concerning certain tracts of land that it owns. These claims must be raised in the 
condemnation proceeding and not, as here, in a separate action. Utah law requires that all 
claims concerning the same transaction or occurrence be heard in a single action. Strong 
public policy supports this rule. To permit damages to be decided for the same conduct 
by two or more courts or juries would all too often lead to the entry of duplicative awards. 
It also would raise the danger of inconsistent verdicts and decisions. 
The State of Utah and its agencies, such as UDOT, are not "persons" that can be 
sued under § 1983. Individual state officers can be sued for injunctive and prospective 
declaratory relief pursuant to Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). But the plaintiff has 
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sued only UDOT. Ex Parte Young does not apply to state agencies, but only to individual 
employees of the state. Even if UDOT could be sued under § 1983, such a claim would 
have to be raised either in the condemnation action or in a separate action filed after the 
completion of the condemnation proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WINTERGREEN'S CLAIMS SHOULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT 
AS COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS IN THE CONDEMNATION 
PROCEEDING 
Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning compulsory 
counterclaims, provides that: 
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time 
of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it 
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the 
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence 
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. . . J 
All of the plaintiffs claims arise out of the ongoing condemnation proceeding. 
They are all part of a single transaction or occurrence. The gist of Wintergreen's action is 
its claim that its constitutional rights will be violated by the condemnation action. The 
trial court correctly dismissed this action as being in violation of this rule. "The purpose 
of rule 13(a) is to ensure that all relevant claims arising out of a given transaction are 
litigated in the same action/' Raile Family Trust v. Promax Dev. Co., 2001 UT 40, ^|12. 
1
 The omitted portions of the rule contain two exceptions that are not relevant to 
this action. 
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24 P.3d 980 (contract, slander of title and tort claims should have been raised as 
compulsory counterclaims in mechanics" lien action). Where a claim should have been 
presented as a compulsory counterclaim and wasn't, it is forever barred. Todaro v. 
Gardner. 285 P.2d 839, 842 (Utah 1955). 
Campbell also asks that we remand this case to enable him to 
establish his damages flowing from Kimball's alleged breach of the subject 
contract. We decline to do so for two reasons. First, Campbellfs 
counterclaim was compulsory under Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure because it arose out of the transaction that is the subject matter of 
plaintiffs claim. Therefore, his failure to file a counterclaim resulted in a 
waiver. 
Kimball v. Campbell 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) (breach of contract claim waived 
because it was not raised as a compulsory counterclaim to plaintiffs suit concerning a 
breach of the same contract). 
The same result was reached in Yanaka v. lomed. Inc.. 2005 UT App 239, 116 
P.3d 962. Iomed brought an action against a former employee. Yanaka. In that action 
lomed alleged that Yanaka had violated two agreements he had entered into while 
employed with the company. Although he filed some counterclaims in Iomed's action, 
Yanaka filed his claims of discriminatory employment practices as a separate action. The 
court of appeals held that the discrimination claims should have been filed as 
counterclaims to Iomed's lawsuit because they dealt with the same transaction or 
occurrence: Yanaka's employment with lomed and the agreements between the parties. 
Yanaka. 2005 UT App 239 at ffi|6-8. 
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Wintergreen's claims arise out of the condemnation process. As such they arise 
out of the same transaction or occurrence as does the consolidated condemnation 
proceeding and should have been raised in that action. The trial court correctly dismissed 
these claims on this basis and its decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
Notably, the trial court's decision in this matter does not totally preclude 
Wintergreen from seeking to raise its claims in the condemnation proceeding. 
Wintergreen can still seek to raise its claims as omitted counterclaims in the 
condemnation proceeding. See Utah R. Civ. P. 13(e) (leave of court may be sought to 
permit an amendment to add a counterclaim that was omitted). 
II. WINTERGREEN'S FEDERAL CLAIMS CANNOT BE 
BROUGHT AGAINST UDOT UNDER § 1983 
As a matter of federal law, the State of Utah and its agencies are entitled to 
absolute sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over suits by private 
parties against a state. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida. 517 U.S. 44. 54-55 (1995). This 
Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief 
sought. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy. Inc.. 506 U.S. 139, 
146 (1993); Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman. 465 U.S. 89. 100-01 (1984). 
Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans we have understood the 
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the 
presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that the 
States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; that the 
judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty; and that a 
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State will therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has 
consented to suit, either expressly or in the "plan of the convention." 
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak. 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). 
Because of the State of Utah's sovereign immunity, no federal claim can be 
brought against the state unless its immunity has been waived. Sovereign immunity can 
be waived by Congress in certain circumstances, and by the states themselves. 
Congress can waive the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity "by making its 
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Dellmuth v. Muth. 491 U.S. 
223, 227-28 (1989). But the only time that Congress can waive Eleventh Amendment 
immunity is when it is acting pursuant to a valid exercise of power. Green v. Mansour. 
474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). The only congressional power that has been held, to date, to 
validly authorize Congress to waive the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity is Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Seminole Tribe of Fla, 517 U.S. at 59-63 (1996); 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). If Congress does not have the authority 
to waive the immunity of the states in federal court, it is without the power to waive their 
immunity in state courts as well. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999). Of most 
importance to the present action is the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a 
waiver of the immunity of the states. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979). 
Nor can a state agency, such as UDOT, be sued under § 1983. In Will v. Michigan 
Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), the Supreme Court expressly held 
that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under 
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§ 1983." This Court, following Will has also concluded that § 1983 claims cannot be 
brought against state agencies because they are not "persons" under the statute. Ambus v. 
Utah State Bd ofEduc. 858 P 2d 1372, 1376-77 (Utah 1993). The Utah Court of 
Appeals has followed this Court and the United States Supreme Court in holding that 
Utah and its agencies cannot be sued under § 1983: 
Finally, Seare contends that the trial court erred m concluding that 
the University and its agents were not "persons" who could be sued under 
42 U.S C. § 1983 for civil rights violations. The United States Supreme 
Court m Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 
S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), held that states cannot be sued in their 
own courts for civil rights violations under section 1983. In Will, the Court 
held that the state of Michigan and its police department could not be sued 
m a Michigan state court for civil rights violations The Court stated that 
"[i]t is an 'established principle of jurisprudence' that the sovereign cannot 
be sued m its own courts without its consent We cannot conclude that 
§ 1983 was intended to disregard the well established immunity of a State 
from being sued without its consent." Further, the Court held that state 
officials acting in their official capacity are not "persons" who may be sued 
under section 1983. 
In the instant case, Seare is suing the University of Utah School of 
Medicine and a number of its employees. Under Utah law, the University 
and its School of Medicine are state institutions Additionally, the state has 
expressly declared that it maintains its immunity from civil rights claims. 
Thus, the trial court was correct m ruling that the University of Utah School 
of Medicine cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that its employees 
acting m their official capacity, as is the case here, are not "persons" who 
can be sued under section 1983 
Seare v. Univ. of Utah, 882 P 2d 673. 679 (Utah App. 1994) (footnote and citations 
omitted) See also Windward Partners v. Anvoshi 693 F 2d 928, 928-30 (9th Cir. 1982) (a 
takings claim could not be brought under § 1983 against the state of Hawaii because of 
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the Eleventh Amendment and plaintiffs suit against state officers for damages was really 
a prohibited suit against the state). 
Because Congress has not waived the immunity of Utah for a § 1983 claim, no 
such cause of action can exist unless Utah has waived its own immunity. While the states 
can waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity, such waivers will not be inferred easily. 
The United States Supreme Court has said: "we will find waiver only where stated 'by the 
most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave 
no room for any other reasonable construction.5" Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida. 450 
U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan. 415 U.S. 65U 673 (1974)). A state 
does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting a statute authorizing suits 
against the state in its own courts. Id. Utah, far from waiving its sovereign immunity, has 
expressly stated in the Governmental Immunity Act that its immunity is retained for 
injuries arising out of connected with, or resulting from a violation of civil rights. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(b) (West Supp. 2006). 
The cases relied upon by Wintergieen in claiming it can sue the state and its 
agencies do not involve § 1983 claims against the states. Most of them deal with suits 
against state officials and not the state.2 Others are appeals from state supreme courts on 
2
 Lingle v. Chevron USA. Inc.. 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (suit against governor and 
attorney general); Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (suit against 
non-profit organization and officials): Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedict's. 
480 U.S. 470 (1987) (suit against state officials); Webb*s Fabulous Pharmacies. Inc. v. 
Beckwrth, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (suit against county and officials). 
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claims other than those asserted under § 1983.3 The remaining two decisions deal with 
actions against the United States4 and against the City of Chicago.5 
Nor does Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), help the plaintiff. Wintergreen 
erroneously claims it can sue UDOT under Ex Parte Young. Appellant's Opening Brief 
at 16-17. But Ex Parte Young involved a suit against a state official for prospective relief 
only. This exception permits suits against individual state officers in certain 
circumstances, but not against the states or their agencies. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997) ("The Tribe's suit, accordingly, is barred by Idaho's 
Eleventh Amendment immunity unless it falls within the exception this Court has 
recognized for certain suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officers 
in their individual capacities.") (citation omitted). As this Court noted in Ambus, officials 
can be sued for injunctive relief because such claims are not treated as being against the 
state. Ambus, 858 P.2d at 1376. In Couer d'Alene, the court found Idaho to be immune 
from suit. It then considered whether an Ex Parte Young action could be brought against 
individual state officers. Couer d'Alene. 521 U.S. at 269-88. 
The same result was reached in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of 
Maryland, 535 U.S. 635 (2002). Petitioners had brought their action against a state 
3
 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comnrn, 483 U.S. 825(1987). 
4
 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933). 
5
 Chicago. B. & O. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
n 
commission and its members. The Court decided it did not need to determine if the 
commission had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, because an Ex Parte Young 
action had been properly brought against the members of the commission and only 
prospective relief was sought. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 645. ("Whether the Commission 
waived its immunity is another question we need not decide, because - as the same parties 
also argue - even absent waiver, Verizon may proceed against the individual 
commissioners in their official capacities, pursuant to the doctrine of Ex parte Young."). 
In a final effort to support its federal claims, Wintergreen claims that it can litigate 
its federal takings claims in this separate action. Opening Brief of Appellant at 41. To 
support this claim, plaintiff relies on San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 125 S.Ct. 2491 (2005). Rather than create a right to file a 
separate action to litigate a federal takings claim, San Remo only continued the prior 
understanding that a federal claim could be raised in the same action brought by the state 
to condemn the private property. 
The requirement that aggrieved property owners must seek "compensation 
through the procedures the State has provided for doing so." does not 
preclude state courts from hearing simultaneously a plaintiffs request for 
compensation under state law and the claim that, in the alternative, the 
denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution. 
San Remo. 125 S.Ct. At 2506 (citation omitted). The procedure provided by Utah is the 
condemnation proceeding. The trial court can hear plaintiffs federal takings claims 
simultaneously to determining the condemnation claims. It continues to be federal law 
12 
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that a Fifth Amendment takings claim is not ripe until after "just compensation" has been 
denied in the state proceeding. Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank. 473 U.S. 172, 186, 
193(1985). 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, UDOT asks this Court to affirm the trial couifs 
decision dismissing this action and leaving the plaintiff free to raise any constitutional 
claims it might have in the consolidated condemnation action. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ O day of August, 2006. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant - Appellee 
1J> 
ADDENDUM "A 
Article I, Section 22. (Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation. 
Rule 13. COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM. 
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any 
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing 
party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the 
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third 
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the 
claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another 
pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or 
other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal 
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 
13. 
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim 
against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim. 
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or may not 
diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim relief 
exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the pleading of the opposing 
party. 
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which either 
matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, with the 
permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading. 
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through 
oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave 
of court set up the counterclaim by amendment. 
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim 
by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject-matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any 
property that is the subject-matter of the original action. Such cross-claim may include a 
claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant 
for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. 
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties other 
than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the 
determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in 
as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained. 
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be 
rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of the opposing 
party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of. 
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross demands 
have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one had brought an action 
against the other, a counterclaim could have been set up. the two demands shall be 
deemed compensated so far as they equal each other, and neither can be deprived of the 
benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision 
(j) of this rule. 
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to negotiable 
instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim which could have been asserted against an assignor at the time of or before notice 
of such assignment, may be asserted against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee. 
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an 
act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For 
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of 
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
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Plaintiff by and through its undersigned counsel of record hereby alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) because this is a civil 
matter not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
2. This Court is the proper venue for this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1, 
because this action involves real property in Tooele County, and pursuant to § 78-13-7 because it 
arises in Tooele County. 
PARTIES 
3. Plaintiff Wintergreen Group, LC is a Utah limited liability company doing business in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. Defendant State of Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") is the Utah state entity 
with general responsibility for state transportation systems pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-1-
201(1). 
BACKGROUND ALLEGATIONS 
5. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff owned several parcels of land in Tooele located on 
the west and east sides of State Road 36 (SR-36), between 2000 North and 2400 North Streets 
(hereinafter "Plaintiffs lands"). Such lands consisted of a total of approximately 121.116 acres. 
(Plaintiffs lands are depicted on a portion of the Tooele Master Transportation Plan Map attached 
hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference.) 
6. At all times relevant herein, UDOT has been engaged in a project to widen SR-36 and to 
conduct ancillary construction and improvements encompassing an area that includes the vicinity 
of Plaintiff s lands (hereinafter "UDOT SR-36 Project"). 
7. Prior to the UDOT SR-36 Project, Plaintiff intended to use all its lands, both on the west 
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and east sides of SR-36, for construction of the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated 
economic unit. 
8. On March 305 2004, UDOT served Plaintiff with summons and a complaint for 
condemnation in Case Number 040300459 (hereinafter "the 459 condemnation lawsuit"), in which 
UDOT sought to condemn fee title to a strip of land of .275 acres belonging to Plaintiff located on 
the east side SR-36, along 2400 North Street. (A map showing the parcel is attached hereto as 
Exhibit B and incorporated herein by reference.) 
9. On April 15, 2004. UDOT served Plaintiff with summons and a complaint for 
condemnation in Case Number 040300524 (hereinafter "the 524 condemnation lawsuit"), in which 
UDOT sought to condemn several parts of a 16.666-acre parcel of land owned by Plaintiff located 
on the east side of SR-36, bordered by 2000 North on the south, 400 East on the east, and 2200 
North on the north (hereinafter "the East Side land"). The 524 condemnation lawsuit sought to 
condemn fee title to two parcels of the land, together comprising 2.183 acres, one perpetual 
easement of .111 acres, and three temporary easements amounting to .022 acres. (A map showing 
the location of Plaintiff s East Side land subject to the 524 condemnation lawsuit is attached hereto 
as Exhibit C and incorporated herein by reference.) 
10. Also on April 15, 2004, UDOT served Plaintiff with summons and a complaint for 
condemnation in Case Number 040300525 (hereinafter "the 525 condemnation lawsuit"), in which 
UDOT sought to condemn fee title to a strip of land of 2.147 acres belonging to Plaintiff located on 
the west side SR-36. along the boundaries of four adjacent parcels of land owned by Plaintiff which 
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collectively amounted to 104.175 acres (hereinafter "the West Side land"). (A map showing the 
location of Plaintiff s West Side land subject to the 525 condemnation lawsuit is attached hereto as 
Exhibit D and incorporated herein by reference.) 
11. On July 1,2004. the trial court entered an Order of Immediate Occupancy in each of the 
459, 524 and 525 condemnation lawsuits. 
12. As a proximate result of the UDOT SR-36 Project, all of Plaintiffs lands have been 
reduced to one 14.483-acre parcel on the east side of SR-36-subject to one perpetual easement and 
three temporary easements-and four adjacent parcels along the west side of SR-36 consisting of 
102.028 acres (hereinafter collectively "Plaintiffs remaining lands"). 
13. As a proximate result of the UDOT SR-36 Project, Plaintiffs lands have been reduced 
in total size to 116.511 acres, and such remaining lands also are subject to the perpetual easement 
and three temporary easements resulting from the 524 condemnation lawsuit. 
14. As a proximate result of the UDOT SR-36 Project, UDOT permanently blocked off 
traffic between SR-36 and 2000 North Street, which borders the southern boundary of Plaintiffs 
remaining East Side land located on the east side of SR-36. 
15. As proximate result of the UDOT SR-36 Project, UDOT condemned 2200 North in the 
524 condemnation lawsuit, but rendered 2200 North only a right-in, right-out street in relation to 
SR-36. 
16. As a proximate result of UDOT's blocking of 2000 North, in conjunction with UDOT's 
rendering of 2200 North as a right-in. right-out street in relation to SR-36, Plaintiffs access to 
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southbound SR-36 from its remaining East Side land is unreasonably restricted to traveling east on 
2000 North or 2200 North to 400 East, then north to 2400 North, and then finally south on SR-36. 
17. Although UDOT condemned and opened 2200 North as part of the UDOT SR-36 
Project, UDOT did not open 2200 North going westward from SR-36 toward the Overlake 
Subdivision located immediately west of Plaintiff s remaining West Side land, as anticipated by the 
Tooele Master Transportation Plan. 
18. As a proximate result of UDOT's condemnation of part of Plaintiffs lands; UDOT's 
failure to open 2200 North westbound from SR-36; UDOT's rendering of 2200 North as a right-in, 
right-out street in relation to SR-36; and UDOT's blocking of 2000 North from traffic in relation to 
SR-36, all of Plaintiffs remaining lands have been isolated from each other, Plaintiff has been 
prevented from developing its lands into the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated 
economic unit, and Plaintiffs remaining lands have been substantially diminished in value. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
Inverse Condemnation Through Partial Taking 
- U.S. Const., Amend 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
19. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the provisions of this complaint set forth 
above. 
20. Defendant UDOT through the UDOT SR-36 Project imposed substantial economic harm 
on Plaintiffs remaining lands, Plaintiff has demanded compensation for such harm, and UDOT 
refuses to pay such compensation. 
21. Such conduct by UDOT was undertaken under color of state law and was implementing 
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official custom and policy. 
22. Such conduct by UDOT constitutes a partial taking of Plaintiff s property. 
23. Such conduct by UDOT was undertaken for the public use of widening SR-36 for the 
benefit of the public. 
24. Such conduct by UDOT violates Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional right to be 
free from a partial taking of its property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C Section 1983. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
Inverse Condemnation Through Categorical Total Taking 
- U.S. Const., Amend 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
25. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the provisions of this complaint set forth 
above. 
26. Defendant UDOT through the UDOT SR-36 Project imposed substantial economic harm 
on Plaintiffs remaining lands, Plaintiff has demanded compensation for such harm, and UDOT 
refuses to pay such compensation. 
27. Such conduct by UDOT was undertaken under color of state law and was implementing 
official custom and policy. 
28. Such conduct by UDOT constitutes a categorical total taking of the reduction in value 
of Plaintiffs remaining lands resulting from UDOT's conduct. 
29. Such conduct by UDOT was undertaken for the public use of widening SR-36 for the 
benefit of the public. 
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30 Such conduct by UDOT violates Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional right to be 
free from a categorical total taking of its property without just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U S C Section 1983. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
ln>erse Condemnation Thiough Not Substantially 
Ad^ancing a Legitimate Go\ernmental Objective 
- U.S. Const., Amend 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
31 Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the provisions of this complaint set forth 
above 
32 Defendant UDOT through the UDOT SR-36 Project imposed substantial economic harm 
on Plaintiffs remaining lands, Plaintiff has demanded compensation for such harm, and UDOT 
refuses to pay such compensation 
33 Such conduct by UDOT w as undertaken under color of state law and was implementing 
official custom and policy 
34 Such conduct by UDOT was undertaken m pursuit of the legitimate governmental 
objective of widening SR-36 for the benefit of the public 
35 Such conduct by UDOT did not substantially advance such legitimate governmental 
objective because UDOT engaged in excessive condemnation, failed to open 2200 North westbound 
from SR-36, rendered 2200 North as a right-m, nght-out street m relation to SR-36, and blocked 
2000 North from traffic m relation to SR-36 
36 As a proximate result of UDOT's conduct all of Plaintiff s remaining lands have been 
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isolated from each other, Plaintiff has been prevented from developing its lands into the North Town 
Shopping Center as an integrated economic unit, and Plaintiffs remaining lands have been 
substantially diminished in value. 
37. Such conduct by UDOT violates Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional right to be 
free from a taking of its property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
Inverse Condemnation Taking of Property - Destruction or Materia] Lessening of Value 
Utah Constitution Art. I, § 22 
38. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the provisions of this complaint set forth 
above. 
39. UDOT's conduct substantially interfered with and destroyed or materially lessened the 
value of Plaintiffs remaining lands. 
40. Such conduct by UDOT violates Plaintiffs constitutional right to be free from a taking 
of its property without just compensation under Utah Constitution Article I. Section 22. 
41. Such conduct by UDOT constitutes a taking without just compensation of Plaintiffs 
property for the benefit of the public. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
Inverse Condemnation Taking of Property - Use and Enjoyment Abridged or Destroyed 
Utah Constitution Art. 1, § 22 
42. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the provisions of this complaint set forth 
above. 
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43. UDOT's conduct in substantial degree abridged or destroyed Plaintiffs right to use and 
enjoyment of Plaintiffs remaining lands. 
44. Such conduct by UDOT violates Plaintiffs constitutional right to be free from a taking 
of its property without just compensation under Utah Constitution Article I, Section 22. 
45. Such conduct by UDOT constitutes a taking without just compensation of Plaintiffs 
property for the benefit of the public. 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
Inverse Condemnation Through Damaging of Property - Utah Constitution Art. I, § 22 
46. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the provisions of this complaint set forth 
above. 
47. UDOT through the physical conduct of failure to open 2200 North westbound from SR-
36, rendering of 2200 North as a right-in, right-out street in relation to SR-36, and blocking of 2000 
North from traffic in relation to SR-36, destroyed Plaintiffs right to develop its remaining lands into 
the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated economic unit, which gave Plaintiffs remaining 
lands additional value. 
48. UDOT's conduct caused Plaintiff special damage in excess of that sustained by the 
public generally because Plaintiffs remaining East Side land was rendered isolated from Plaintiffs 
remaining West Side land, as well as from the areas surrounding Plaintiffs remaining East Side land, 
because Plaintiff no longer has access to or from SR-36 on 2000 North, and has no access to 
southbound SR-36 from 2200 North, but instead must travel a circuitous route eastward on 2000 
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North or 2200 North, then north on 400 East, then finally south on SR-36. 
49. Such damage sustained by Plaintiff is a definite physical injury cognizable to the senses 
because Plaintiffs remaining lands are isolated from each other as well as from SR-36 to a 
substantial degree. 
50. Such damage sustained by Plaintiff has a perceptible effect on the present market value 
of Plaintiff s remaining lands because all of such lands have been isolated from each other, Plaintiff 
has been prevented from developing its lands into the North Town Shopping Center as an integrated 
economic unit, and Plaintiffs remaining lands have been substantially diminished in value. 
51. Such conduct by UDOT violates Plaintiffs constitutional right to be free from a 
damaging of its property without just compensation under Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 22. 
52. Such conduct by UDOT constitutes a damaging without just compensation of Plaintiff s 
property for the public use of widening SR-36 for the benefit of the public. 
53. Plaintiff demands jury trial upon all issues so triable, and hereby tenders the jury fee to 
the Clerk of the Court. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE. Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
a) For Plaintiffs inverse condemnation damages, in a sum of not less than four million 
Dollars ($4,000,000.00). or such greater or lesser sum as determined at trial; 
b) For interest on Plaintiffs inverse condemnation damages from July 1, 2004, the date of 
the Orders of Immediate Occupancy in the three condemnation lawsuits; 
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c) For plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs, in the sum of one hundred fifty thousand dollars 
($ 150,000.00), plus interest to date of payment, or such other greater or lesser sum as the Court may 
find reasonable and proper; 
d) For an injunction: 
i) mandating Defendant UDOT to open 2200 North westbound from SR-36; to render 
2200 North as a four-way intersection at SR-36, with appropriate traffic signal devices; to remove 
the obstruction of 2000 North from traffic to and from SR-36 northbound and southbound; 
ii) prohibiting Defendant UDOT from construction on the UDOT Project that will 
prevent implementation of this court's mandatory injunction; 
iii) requiring that Plaintiff provide appropriate security pursuant to Rule 65A(c)(l) 
as determined by the court for purposes of such injunctive relief; and 
c) For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this ^ P day of March, 2005. 
NICK J. CO^ESSIDES 
Attorney vox Plaintiff 
Plaintiff in this action: 
Wintergreen Group LC 
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Defendant 
The above matter came before the Court for oral argument on 
Defendant Utah Department of Transportation's (UDOT) Motion to Dismiss. 
Plaintiff Wmtergreen Group LC ("Wmtergreen") was represented by Nick 
J. Colessides and John Martinez, and the Utah Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT") was represented by Randy S. Hunter. 
BACKGROUND 
Wmtergreen filed this action alleging s±x total causes of action. 
The causes of action essentially claim inverse condemnation under the 5tY 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America and 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 as well as Article I § 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
Wmtergreen owns several parcels of land totaling 121.116 acres m 
Tooele locatea on the west and east siaes of State Road 36 (SR-36) 
between 2000 North and 2400 North Streets (hereinafter "Wmtergreen's 
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lands") . UDOT is engagea in a project to widen SR-36 and other 
improvements in the area of Wmtergreen' s lands. As part of the SR-36 
project UDOT initiated conaemnation proceedings on three different pieces 
of Wmtergreen's lands m March ana April of 2004. Each piece is the 
subject of its own condemnation lawsuit filed in this Court. On July 1, 
2004 this Court enterea an Order of Immediate Occupancy in each of the 
three condemnation lawsuits. 
As a result of the UDOT SR-36 project, Wmtergreen alleges its 
properties have been reduced by a total size of 4.605 acres and that such 
taking has artificially severed the parcels from each other thereby 
interfering with Wmtergreen's development of the property as a whole 
unit. In addition, Wmtergreen alleges UDOT's control of traffic around 
Wmtergreen's lands has further isolated Wmtergreen's three parcels from 
each other, thereby preventing Wmtergreen from developing its lands into 
an integrated project it refers to as the North Town Shopping Center. 
Hence, Wmtergreen claims its remaining lands have been substantially 
diminished in value and that the only way to address such an impact is 
by inverse condemnation. 
In its Motion to Dismiss, UDOT claims an inverse condemnation action 
is inappropriate in this case because inverse ccndemnation is used when 
a public entity takes private property without formal exercise of eminent 
aomam power, which does not exist here. UDOT had initiated condemnation 
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proceedings, as previously noted. UDOT further claims Wintergreen's 
inverse condemnation action should be heard as a single action and that 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to states or state officials acting in 
their official capacities. Finally, UDOT claims the inverse condemnation 
claims are not ripe for adjudication because Wintergreen has failed to 
exhaust its remedies through the condemnation action. 
Wintergreen's opposition to UDOT's Motion argues that the only 
vehicle to address the resulting harm to Wintergreen's entire property 
is through inverse condemnation proceedings. Wintergreen further claims 
UDOT has not properly identified the relevant property at issue in its 
separate suits, tnus making this action necessary. Wintergreen further 
claims its action is different from UDOT's because UDOT's action is 
statutory where as Wintergreen's claim is constitutional. Wintergreen 
also claims the basis for its claims is not § 1983. Instead, § 1983 only 
provides the remedies for Wintergreen' s federal claims, but the 5tJ~ 
Amendment and tiie doctrine of Ex Parte Young are the source of 
Wintergreen's substantive rights. Finally, Wintergreen claims its cause 
of action is ripe. Specifically, it alleges the state claims are ripe 
for adjudication because only available administrative remedies need be 
exhausted. 
DISCUSSION 
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss accepts as true the facts alleged 
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in the complaint but challenge*- the party's right to relief based on 
those facts. Oakwood Vill. L.L.C. v. Alberstons, Inc., 2004 UT 101 J 8 
(2004). The purpose of a motion to dismiss "is to challenge the formal 
sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish the facts or 
resolve the merits of a case." Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 
910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). "A dismissal is a severe measure and 
should be granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is 
not entitled to relief unaer any state of facts which could be proved in 
support of its claim." Colman v Utah State Land Bd. , 795 P.2d 622, 624 
(Utah 1990). 
Wmtergreen's first three claims are based on the 5th Amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States of America and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The 5th Amendment applies to the states through the 14th Amendment. 
Wmtergreen' s fourth, fifth, ana sixth claims are based on the Utah 
Constitution Art I, §22. Wmtergreen argues this inverse conaemnation 
action brought under the state and federal constitutions is different 
from the condemnation actions because it encompasses all of Wmtergreen's 
lands and because it is grounoed on principles of constitutional right 
instead of legislative grace. Wmtergreen claims that filing a 
condemnation action under the state statutory scheme does not preclude 
the filing of a constitutional inverse condemnation action, citing 
Colman v. Utah State Lano Bd. , 705 P.2d 622, 634 (Utah 1990) (Colman), ana 
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Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (Dolan) , to support this 
proposition. However, Wmtergreen' s reliance on Colman and Dolan is 
misguided. 
In Colman, the government, through an act of Congress, created a 
breach m a causeway across the Great Salt Lake to prevent serious 
flooding. Plaintiff ownea a canal that was destroyed because of the 
breach. The government did not file a condemnation action. Plaintiff 
filed an inverse conaemnation action unoer the Utah State Constitution 
seeking just compensation for the damage to his property. The Court held 
an inverse condemnation action under Article I §22 is not subject to the 
limitations found m the Governmental Immunity Act. The court did not 
find that had the government filed a condemnation suit a constitutional 
violation would still exist allowing the plaintiff to file an inverse 
condemnation action claiming a constitutional violation. Dolan fails for 
the same reason. 
Wmtergreen has not cited a single case where an inverse 
condemnation action was filed after the government agency filed a 
condemnation action seeking to take the property in exchange for just 
compensation. Instead, m every case citea t>y Wmtergreen the government 
enactea some regulation diminishing the value of the private property 
without ever filing a conaemnation action. In these cases, Wmtergreen 
filed an inverse condemnation action to enforce their rights in the face 
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of already pending condemnation actions. 
The Court finds an inverse condemnation action is inappropriate in 
this case. The Utah Code provides the statutory framework for parties 
to seek rearess for the exercise of eminent domain. Utah Code § 78-34-10 
provides broad remedies of recovery for damages, including severance 
aamages to remaining parcels of lana affected by the exercise of eminent 
domain. The proper procedural action to force the government to pay just 
compensation for damages to the entire property and not just the three 
individual parcels is to consolidate the three conaemnation actions, 
which the Court orders on its own motion. The Court grants the motion 
to dismiss all claims based on the arguments of state or federal 
constitution remeaies, as such remedies are provided by statute. 
Wmtergreen further claims the inverse action is separate from the 
condemnation suits because it allows for different calculation of 
damages, namely attorneys' fees, under §1983. The Utah courts have not 
directly addressed this issue, however, tne Court of Appeals of Georgia 
was faced with a similar claim made unaer § 1983 in a takings case. The 
property owners claimeo the taking of tneir property constituted a taking 
unaer color of right by the state ana deprived them of their rights, 
privileoes and immunities under the Constitution violating 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. The Court found a taking which is no more than an ordinary legal 
action by the Department of Transportation to taKe property in accordance 
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with the statutes of the state is not enough to convert the action into 
a civil rights violation, so as to allow for attorneys' fees, 
particularly when the property owners have not objected to the propriety 
of the taking but just to the amount of compensation. Jackson v. 
Department of Transp., 159 Ga. App. 130, 283 S.E.2d 59 (Ga.App., 1981); 
See also 3-8 Nichols on Eminent Domain @ 8.01. Furthermore, the Jackson 
Court also noted the long established law that states that attorneys' 
fees are not a part of condemnation actions. In Utah, attorneys' fees 
are likewise not provided for in the statute for damages, U.C.A. § 78-34-
10. 
Wmtergreen claims § 1983 provides the remedies for its federal 
claims ana is not the basis of its feaeral claims. Instead, 
Wmtergreen' s feaeral claims are based on the 5t)r Amendment and come under 
the doctrine of Ex Parte Young. However, the Court is persuaded by the 
Georgia Court of Appeals' reasoning m Jackson. The Court finds this is 
an ordinary exercise of the power of eminent domain by UDOT and a claim 
for attorneys' fees is inappropriate because the law does not provide for 
such relief in this instance. 
Wmtergreen claims it is entitled to an injunction stopping UDOT 
from controlling traffic in such a manner as to limit access to its 
property. In Colman v. Utah State Land Bd. , 795 P.2d at 622 (quoting 
Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 362, 145 F. 1047, 1051 (1915)), the 
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Supreme Court of Utah held that ua landowner cannot complain because he 
is inconvenienced in the use of his property, where such inconvenience 
arises out of the proper enforcement of the police power to protect the 
public health, and where such enforcement does not amount to a taking or 
destruction of his property." The Court finds that Wintergreen has not 
alleged sufficient facts to show that control of the flow of traffic 
rises to the level of a taking of property. It may be an inconvenience 
to drive a few extra blocks around the property when entering it, but it 
is not a taking. UDOT has the very important task of protecting the 
public by controlling traffic especially in construction zones. 
Furthermore, Wintergreen's injunction is reliant on § 1983, which the 
Court has found is not applicable in this case, and should be dismissed 
on this basis as well. 
The Court GRANTS UDOT's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and orders 
the three condemnation suits, 040300459, 040300524, 040300525, against 
Wintergreen be consolidatea. Mr. Hunter to prepare the Order. 
Orderea this day J>* of Marcn, 2006. 
< - ^ = ^ r 
RANDALL N. S K A N C l i I _ _ > 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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